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The Scottish Enlightenment and public govern-
ance of the economic system
 
maria pia paganelli
Often the idea of a “natural system of liber-
ty” is associated with Adam Smith and oth-
er Scottish philosophers of his age. Often 
the idea of a “natural system of liberty” is 
associated with the idea of a free economic 
system that, thanks to the self-interest of 
all individuals, is self-regulating and gen-
erates opulence and freedom. If only indi-
viduals were left alone, they would be able 
to generate, unintentionally, an economic 
system that leads to prosperity for all. This 
vision is correct but it may not be complete. 
While it is true that the “system of natural 
liberty” described in the Scottish Enlight-
enment is a natural system, it is also true 
that there are other natural forces that un-
dermine the development and the stability 
of this natural system. What is natural in 
the “natural system of liberty” is therefore 
ambiguous. There are many conflicting 
forces and tendencies in human nature; the 
outcome of their interactions can be wel-
come or dreadful. How natural, then, is the 
’natural system of liberty’ envisioned by the 
Scottish Enlightenment?
Understanding how natural the “natu-
ral system of liberty” is is relevant because 
it may help us understand if and how it is 
possible to enhance it in the parts of the 
world that have experienced it, to pro-
tect it in the parts of the world where it is 
threatened, and to replicate it in parts of 
the world that have not experienced it yet. 
Additionally, we can try to understand why, 
if this system is natural, it has taken so long 
for it to emerge in some parts of the world 
or why in some other parts of the world it 
has not emerged at all. And if it is not so 
natural, does it make sense to try to export 
it to countries that did not experience it and 
ask them to adopt it?
In this essay I will concentrate on Adam 
Smith, a key figure of the Scottish Enlight-
enment, and the most prominent expositor 
of the system of natural liberty. To under-
stand the role of public governance on the 
economic system, I will try to understand 
Smith’s idea of the “system of natural liber-
ty” and how public governance may interact 
with it by looking at it in four possible ways: 
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natural as normal, natural as good, natural 
as perfect, and natural as “good enough.” I 
claim that for Smith, a “system of natural 
liberty” is neither normal nor perfect, but 
rather that it is good and that it can work 
even under acceptable but non-ideal con-
ditions.
One way in which we can read the emer-
gence of the “natural system of liberty” is 
that, since the system is natural, it is which 
we should expect to happen. Natural is what 
normally happens. 
There are at least two loci in the Wealth 
of Nations that can be used to show that, if 
individuals are left alone, good institutions 
and opulence will emerge: one is Smith’s 
description of the emergence and develop-
ment of towns and cities; the other is the 
working of the invisible hand. The natural 
system of liberty is natural because we reg-
ularly see the growth of opulence connected 
with the growth of cities and towns, as well 
as the growth of opulence connected with 
the working of individual self-interest.
Smith claims that the natural system 
of liberty started to emerge with the fall of 
the feudal and ecclesiastical powers and 
the introduction of the commercial sys-
tem, thanks to the growth of towns and cit-
ies. This development was not planned but 
emerged spontaneously. No individual, no 
government policy was responsible for this 
growth. As a matter of fact, the silent and 
unplanned revolution of commerce was 
able to achieve what no army, rational plan, 
or public governance would have been able 
to achieve. «All the violence of the feudal 
institutions could never have effected, the 
silent and insensible operation of foreign 
commerce and manufacturers gradually 
brought about»1. 
Similarly:
[T]hat immense and well-built fabric [of the 
feudal system of the church of Rome], which 
all the wisdom and virtue of man could never 
have shaken, much less have overturned, was 
[…] first weakened, and afterwards in part de-
stroyed, and is now likely, in the course of a few 
centuries more, perhaps, to crumble into ruins 
altogether. The gradual improvements of arts, 
manufacturers, and commerce, the same causes 
which destroyed the power of the great barons, 
destroyed in the same manner, through the great 
part of Europe, the whole temporal power of the 
clergy2. 
But, as Joseph Cropsey states, «there is 
nothing in the nature of things which will 
or might ’inevitably’ lead to the coming into 
being of the natural of the most expedient 
social arrangement»3. Indeed, while this 
development seems to be the natural one, 
Smith points out that this natural develop-
ment is not natural at all, and that what is 
natural is not the norm at all. The descrip-
tion of “How the Commerce of the Towns 
contributed to the Improvement in the 
Country” is the fourth chapter of Book III 
of the Wealth of Nations, where Smith de-
scribes the “natural order of things” that 
brings the progress of opulence to different 
countries. In the introductory chapter of 
Book III, titled “Of the natural Progress of 
Opulence,” Smith explains that «the cul-
tivation and improvement of the country, 
therefore which affords subsistence, must 
necessarily, be prior to the increase of the 
towns, which furnishes only the means of 
conveniency and luxury»4: exactly the op-
posite of what he illustrates in chapter 4. 
In fact, three of the four chapters of Book 
III tell the story of how the natural order of 
things was inverted. Smith explicitly warns 
his readers of this inversion of the natu-
ral course of things at the end of the first 
chapter: «But though this natural order of 
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things must have taken place in some de-
gree in every society, it has, in all modern 
states of Europe, been, in many respects, 
entirely inverted»5. 
The economic system linked to the 
progress of opulence took centuries and 
centuries. It developed in unpredictable 
forms. It happened only in certain part 
of Europe, and even there not stably. In-
dia and China were rich as well, but they 
did not enjoy the same freedom as some 
parts of Europe. If prosperity and freedom 
are the natural outcome of the natural or-
der of things, why did they take so long to 
emerge? And why only in some parts of the 
world? How is that possible? Smith seems 
to indicate at least two possible causes: bad 
policies and bad luck. These explanations 
open the door for more questioning of the 
nature of the natural order. Is there a natu-
ral order in nature at all? Even if there is a 
natural order in theory, would its historical 
actualizations reflect it in any way? What if 
David Hume is right? What if the institu-
tional setting of Britain is unique to Britain, 
rather than the normal thing to expect from 
every country? What if the system of natu-
ral liberty is indeed the result of peculiar 
circumstances and historical accidents? 
What if freedom and prosperity are gener-
ated simply by good luck?6 Smith does not 
seem to be able (or willing?) to exclude that 
possibility.
Pratap Bhanu Mehta presents this same 
point in the following way: 
The bulk of The Wealth of Nations is devoted to 
the thought that for much of their history hu-
man beings have not acted on their interests; at 
least, they have set up systems of regulation and 
restraints such that only the interests of a few 
were served. Most important… the interests of 
humans are in conflict. For Smith, there is in a 
sense, nothing natural about the ’system of natu-
ral liberty’. If mankind had by degrees, unevenly 
and uncertainly, emerged from tutelage, it was 
less of a testament to the power of interest than 
to unanticipated consequences of actions or to 
fortuitous combinations of interests7.
With this I am not saying that Smith de-
nies a natural order of things. He states that 
it does exist. Yet, it is not necessarily what 
we observe in reality. The same thing ap-
plies when we consider the natural system 
of liberty as an expression of the working of 
the invisible hand. For Smith the invisible 
hand does exist. It is true that the pursuit of 
individual self-interest leads to the better-
ment of society, as is suggested by the idea 
of the invisible hand. It is also true that the 
introduction of commerce and manufac-
tures brings along «order and good gov-
ernment, and with them, the liberty and 
security of individuals […] This, though it 
has been the least observed, is by far the 
most important of all their effect»8. The 
“regular administration of justice” is gen-
erated by commerce and is the foundation 
of commercial prosperity. Fundamental for 
the sustaining of a system of natural liberty 
is indeed a functioning system of justice 
and that system of justice does emerge9. 
But Smith seems also to ask whether nature 
assures us that this is the end of the story. 
Does the invisible hand instead have to 
wrestle with other natural forces?
Unfortunately, Smith tells us, it is true 
that individual interests can be harmonized 
in the market, but it is also true that indi-
vidual interests may collide with each other 
and destroy or prevent the development 
of the cherished system of natural liberty. 
Markets generate and are held together by 
a functioning system of justice. The laws of 
justice are laws that favor the majority of 
the people, not just a small group. If that is 
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not the case, the system of justice becomes 
a system of monstrous injustice, poisoning 
the beautiful system of natural liberty and 
destroying the benefits that markets gen-
erate. Indeed «Sometimes the interest of 
particular orders of men who tyrannize the 
government, warp the positive law of the 
country from what natural justice would 
prescribe»10. Or: «To hurt in any degree 
the interest of any one order of citizens, 
for no other purpose but to promote that 
of some other, is evidently contrary to that 
justice and equality of treatment which the 
sovereign owes to all the different orders of 
his subjects»11.
So, while the self-interest of the butch-
er, baker, and brewer seems to be the source 
of the natural development of commerce 
and of a prosperous economic system, the 
self-interest of great merchants and man-
ufacturers also causes the system of justice 
to degenerate into a system of lobbies, and 
the system of lobbies becomes a source of 
the most severe injustices. The government 
grants favors to organized interests at the 
expense of the rest of society, and the laws 
become so unjust that
the cruellest of our revenue laws, I will venture 
to affirm, are mild and gentle, in comparison 
of some of those which the clamour of our mer-
chants and manufacturers has extorted from the 
legislature, for the support of their own absurd 
and oppressive monopolies. Like the laws of 
Draco, these laws may be said to be all written in 
blood12.
Mercantilist policies, meant to grant 
monopolies to rapaciously ambitious 
merchants and manufacturers, are not in 
the best interest of society. They increase 
the fortune of a few at the expense of the 
many, impoverishing society13. Merchants 
and manufacturers are, in fact, «an order 
of men whose interest is never exactly the 
same with the public, who generally have 
an interest to deceive and even oppress the 
public, and who accordingly have, upon 
many occasions, both deceived and op-
pressed it»14.
And again: «Their interest is, in this re-
spect, directly opposite to that of the great 
body of the people»15. 
Examples of the virulent dangers of in-
terest groups are, among others, in Wealth of 
Nations, IV.i.10; IV.ii.38; IV.iii.c.1016. And 
an additional source of worry for Smith is 
that concentrated interests are able to con-
vince the government and the public that 
special organized groups are not enemies 
of society but defenders and promoters 
of the wealth of the country17. The natural 
force of self-interest can generate marvels 
of wealth and liberty for all, but it can also 
destroy the natural order of things and the 
system of natural liberty. The problem is 
that the deleterious concentrated interest 
groups are just as natural as the invisible 
hand. Indeed 
People of the same trade seldom meet together, 
even for merriment and diversion, but the con-
versation ends in a conspiracy against the public, 
or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is im-
possible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any 
law which either could be executed, or would be 
consistent with liberty and justice18. 
The concentrated interests of great 
merchants and manufactures are therefore 
strong; they are destructive, and they are 
inevitable. The naturalness of the natural 
system of liberty is counterbalanced by the 
naturalness of conflicting interests. The 
same seed that seems to generate the natu-
ral system of liberty seems also to generate 
its natural lethal threat. The natural eco-
nomic system of commerce and the natural 
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system of liberty that comes with it, there-
fore, do not seem to be the normal outcome 
of nature. 
It may very well be that, as Mehta 
claims 
Establishing the “system of natural liberty” un-
der which every man is “left perfectly free to 
pursue his own interest his own way” is thus for 
Smith a task, rather than something that comes 
naturally (WN, IV.ix.51). The paradox is that the 
very motive, self-interest, that allows that system 
to produce the beneficial consequences it does, 
constantly threatens to undermine it. It is the 
pursuit of their interests that leads merchants 
to demand monopolies and privileges that harm 
society; yet, those very same interests can, un-
der the right institutional conditions, produce 
beneficial outcomes. The Wealth of Nations is 
an account of how the interests of all might be 
harmonized, not a claim that they are always, or 
naturally, in harmony19. 
Yet, even if the system of natural liberty 
is a task, it is not an easy task to achieve. 
Who is going to do it? Why should anyone 
do it? We are left in the hands of our weak 
civic spirit and of a legislator who is exhort-
ed not to fall for the flattery of the lobbyists 
but rather to preserve the system of natural 
liberty out of reverence toward its beau-
ty20. Unfortunately, this seems to be just a 
dream. And in fact, Smith is convinced that 
the «formidable» powers merchants and 
manufacturers have «intimidate the legis-
lature»21 so much that 
[t]o expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade 
should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain, 
is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Uto-
pia should ever be established in it. Not only the 
prejudices of the publick, but what is much more 
unconquerable, the private interests of many in-
dividuals, irresistibly oppose it22. 
Once privileges are granted, they will 
not be taken away. The invisible hand is in a 
constant struggle with the formidable pow-
ers of concentrated interests. 
And just to add another pessimistic 
note, Smith often speaks of an economic 
system as a living body, with economic 
privileges granted by the government func-
tioning like diseases. Privileges granted by 
the government make a body sick. They can 
even kill it. 
The whole system of her industry and commerce 
has thereby been rendered less secure [by the 
monopoly of the colony trade]; the whole state of 
her body politick less healthful, than it otherwise 
would have been. In her present condition, Great 
Britain resembles one of those unwholesome 
bodies in which some of the vital parts are over-
grown, and which, upon that account, are liable 
to many dangerous disorders scarce incident to 
those in which all the parts are more properly 
proportioned. A small stop in that great blood–
vessel, which has been artificially swelled beyond 
its natural dimensions, and through which an 
unnatural proportion of the industry and com-
merce of the country has been forced to circulate, 
is very likely to bring on the most dangerous dis-
orders upon the whole body politick. The expec-
tation of a rupture with the colonies, accordingly, 
has struck the people of Great Britain with more 
terror than they ever felt for a Spanish armada, or 
a French invasion… The blood, of which the cir-
culation is stopt in some of the smaller vessels, 
easily disgorges itself into the greater, without 
occasioning any dangerous disorder; but, when 
it is stopt in any of the greater vessels, convul-
sions, apoplexy, or death, are the immediate and 
unavoidable consequences23.
Additionally, all living bodies, by na-
ture, grow, reach maturity, and die. David 
Hume describes this process of growth and 
decay in the arts. And Smith seems to indi-
cate that, indeed, all major forms of civili-
zation eventually perish, either explicitly by 
human hand or by the events of history. If 
the feudal system and the temporal power 
of the church have been brought down by 
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Original edition of The Wealth of Nations by Adam 
Smith (London, 1776)
the silent revolution of commerce and the 
childish vanity of the nobles and the high 
clergy, why couldn’t the commercial sys-
tem be brought down by the loud attacks 
of lobbies? After all, Smith tells us that an 
economy that has been in an expansion-
ary state may not be expansionary forever. 
It may become stationary or even recede. 
North America, in Smith’s time, was an ex-
ample of an expansionary economy, China 
of a stationary, and Bengal of a declining 
one. When the economic system is over-
governed and the invisible hand is para-
lyzed by interest groups, an economy may 
very well decline. In his words: «The dif-
ference between the genius of the British 
constitution which protects and governs 
North America, and that of the mercan-
tile company which oppresses and domi-
neers in the East Indias, cannot perhaps 
be better illustrated than by the different 
state of those countries»24. The natural 
progress of things toward the natural sys-
tem of liberty is not commonly observed. 
Maybe Cropsey is right when he states 
that «Since history is not the rational ex-
pression of nature but in principle may 
conflict with nature, there arises the need 
for a statement of the strictly natural, which 
of course is the substance of the Wealth of 
Nations, a book that delivers the truth about 
nature»25.
And if that is the case, what is strictly 
natural includes the presence of multiple 
forces and passions, which lead equally to 
positive and negative outcomes. Yet, even if 
the natural system of liberty is not the norm, 
it may still be the underlying tendency to-
ward which we stumble when we are some-
how able to balance our natural conflicting 
passions. The natural system of liberty is a 
good representation of our humanity. And, 
when possible, it should be achieved or 
preserved, because it is the system under 
which our natural tendencies may find the 
most fertile ground for balance, peace, and 
prosperity. To understand this, let’s go back 
to how the commerce of towns contributed 
to the improvement of the country, accord-
ing to Smith. 
Smith credits David Hume for being 
the first to realize «the most important of 
all… the effects [of commerce]»26: that the 
commercial system brings about the natu-
ral system of liberty. Smith does not simply 
report Hume’s analysis; he adds to it. Smith 
grounds his analysis in the nature of man-
kind27. It is thanks to a lucky coincidence 
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of events, and in particular of human pas-
sions, that the old feudal system collapsed 
and that commercial societies occurred.
Human beings are caring, benevolent, 
public spirited, and virtuous, but they are 
also self-interested, vain, proud, short-
sighted, and deluded, just to mention some 
of our characteristics that Smith takes pain 
to describe. Human beings are motivated 
by a variety of conflicting passions, not all 
of which are good. Yet, the combination of 
these passions can, unintentionally, gener-
ate good outcomes: nature has implanted in 
the human breast conflicting passions, and 
it is good that it has, because under the right 
conditions, those conflicting passions allow 
us to gain opulence and freedom. 
Smith’s description of the emergence of 
the economic system based on commerce 
is again indicative of the potentially posi-
tive effects of these conflicting and possibly 
negative characteristics of human beings. 
The fall of the oppressive system of feudal 
lords and the emergence of the natural sys-
tem of liberty seem to be linked to the un-
intended consequences of these apparently 
negative traits of humans. 
All for ourselves, and nothing for other people, 
seems, in every age of the world, to have been 
the vile maxim of the master of mankind. As 
soon, therefore, as [the great barons] could find 
a method of consuming the whole value of their 
rents themselves, they had no disposition to 
share them with any other persons28.
Similarly, in the analysis of the de-
cline of the temporal power of the church, 
Smith claims that «[i]n the produce of arts, 
manufacturers, and commerce, the clergy, 
like the great barons, found something for 
which they could exchange their rude pro-
duce, and thereby discovered the means of 
spending their whole revenues upon their 
own person»29. The barons and the high 
priests are described as being motivated by 
their «most childish, the meanest and the 
most sordid of all vanities» which hope-
lessly attract them to the glitter of a «pair 
of diamond buckles perhaps, or […] some-
thing as frivolous and useless»30. The lords 
run after «trinkets and baubles, fitter to be 
the play-things of children than the serious 
pursuit of men»31. 
Yet, it is for the vain and childish de-
sire of these “trinkets and baubles” that the 
great proprietors, barons or clergy, are will-
ing to sell their great authority. «[Foreign 
commerce and manufactures] gradually 
furnished the great proprietors with some-
thing for which they could exchange […] 
the maintenance, or what is the same thing, 
the price of the maintenance of a thousand 
men for a year, and with it the whole weight 
and authority which it could give them». 
By this exchange, «they gradually bartered 
their whole power and authority»32. They 
will eventually have to sell their birthright 
and their estate, which rich merchants 
are more than happy to buy. According to 
Smith, therefore, the “folly” of gratifying 
“the most childish vanity” brings down the 
feudal system and allows for the growth of 
the system of natural liberty. No govern-
ment, no rational plan, no army, just the 
vanity of the barons and the self-interest of 
the merchants.
Additionally, it is still vanity combined 
with self-interest that not only leads to the 
childish dissipation on frivolous trinkets 
of power, family wealth, and what was sup-
posed to go to help the poor, but also, un-
intentionally, creates incentives to improve 
the cultivation of the land. We are told that 
indeed «merchants are commonly ambi-
tious of becoming country gentlemen, and 
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when they do, they are generally the best 
of all improvers»33 because they carry that 
bold entrepreneurial spirit, which the “old” 
proprietors lack34. 
Smith seems indeed to indicate that, 
despite all of our limits and conflicting 
passions and forces, and bad luck, we still 
naturally have the ability to improve our 
life and society. So, for example, even when 
Nature «in its anger has visited [us] with 
ambition»35, and even when we are delud-
ed regarding what makes us happy, we are 
able to generate steps that lead us toward 
that beautiful system of natural liberty and 
economic prosperity. What I think is tell-
ing here is how Smith explains this devel-
opment: it is well that Nature made us as we 
are made. 
The pleasures of wealth and greatness, when 
considered in this complex view, strike the im-
agination as something grand and beautiful and 
noble, of which the attainment is well worth all 
the toil and anxiety which we are so apt to bestow 
upon it. And it is well that nature imposes upon us 
in this manner. It is this deception which rouses and 
keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind. 
It is this which first prompted them to cultivate 
the ground, to build houses, to found cities and 
commonwealths, and to invent and improve all 
the sciences and arts, which ennoble and embel-
lish human life; which have entirely changed the 
whole face of the globe, have turned the rude for-
ests of nature into agreeable and fertile plains, 
and made the trackless and barren ocean a new 
fund of subsistence, and the great high road of 
communication to the different nations of the 
earth. The earth by these labours of mankind has 
been obliged to redouble her natural fertility, 
and to maintain a greater multitude of inhabit-
ants36. (Emphasis added.)
The system of natural liberty, therefore, 
may not be the norm, but when we achieve 
it, it makes miracles. It may not be the 
norm, but it may be the best system, which 
accommodates the diverging and conflict-
ing human passions, all our limitations, 
and still generates positive results. 
The imperfections of the human be-
ings that Smith describes are reflected also 
in the imperfection of the institutions in 
which we live. Aiming for perfection, both 
in human character and in social institu-
tions is unrealistic and wasteful. And that is 
acceptable. We do not need perfection. We 
are able to achieve an economic system that 
leads to prosperity and liberty even with 
our imperfect means. The system may not 
be perfect, but it still works.  
Tony Aspomourgos presents a convinc-
ing argument that «Smith expresses here a 
conviction that even under second-best (or 
worse) constitutions, regimes and policies, 
’nature’ is still in play, working away for the 
good»37. I will follow him in presenting a 
long citation of Smith as evidence. 
Some speculative physicians seem to have im-
agined that the health of the human body could 
be preserved only by a certain precise regimen 
of diet and exercise, of which every, the smallest, 
violation necessarily occasioned some degree of 
disease or disorder proportioned to the degree of 
the violation. Experience, however, would seem 
to show that the human body frequently pre-
serves, to all appearance at least, the most perfect 
state of health under a vast variety of different 
regimens; even under some which are gener-
ally believed to be very far from being perfectly 
wholesome. But the healthful state of the human 
body, it would seem, contains in itself some un-
known principle of preservation, capable either 
of preventing or of correcting, in many respects, 
the bad effects even of a very faulty regimen. Mr. 
Quesnai, who was himself a physician, and a very 
speculative physician, seems to have entertained 
a notion of the same kind concerning the po-
litical body, and to have imagined that it would 
thrive and prosper only under a certain precise 
regimen, the exact regimen of perfect liberty and 
perfect justice. He seems not to have considered 
that in the political body, the natural effort which 
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every man is continually making to better his 
own condition, is a principle of preservation ca-
pable of preventing and correcting, in many re-
spects, the bad effects of a political œconomy, in 
some degree, both partial and oppressive. Such 
a political œconomy, though it no doubt retards 
more or less, is not always capable of stopping al-
together the natural progress of a nation towards 
wealth and prosperity, and still less of making it 
go backwards. If a nation could not prosper with-
out the enjoyment of perfect liberty and perfect 
justice, there is not in the world a nation which 
could ever have prospered. In the political body, 
however, the wisdom of nature has fortunately 
made ample provision for remedying many of 
the bad effects of the folly and injustice of man; 
in the same manner as it has done in the natural 
body, for remedying those of his sloth and in-
temperance38. 
The role of public governance seem 
therefore to be to avoid interfering with na-
ture and its course, should that be possible. 
To cite Aspromourgos again: 
No policy is offered to ensure that result: it is 
rather conceived of as the natural outcome of a 
competitive economy exhibiting rapid accumu-
lation and growth…Or, one may perhaps better 
say that commercial society—with the rule of law 
enforcing property rights free competition and 
so on—is the policy for bringing about general 
opulence, though nothing in this formula guar-
antees high accumulation, other than human 
nature39.
Smith seems, therefore, to be both 
moderately pessimistic and moderately op-
timistic about the power of nature to gener-
ate and sustain a natural system of liberty. 
On the one hand, there is nothing that can 
guarantee the emergence or sustainment 
of an economic system that generates and 
maintains prosperity and freedom. History 
indeed seems to show how rare that emer-
gence is and how difficult its maintenance 
is. On the other hand, nature seems to be 
powerful enough to allow us to achieve it, 
however imperfectly. 
In his discussion of colony trade, Smith 
reminds us 
we must carefully distinguish between the effects 
of the colony trade and those of the monopoly of 
that trade. The former are always and necessar-
ily beneficial; the latter always and necessarily 
harmful. But the former are so beneficial, that the 
colony trade, thought subject to a monopoly, and 
notwithstanding the hurtful effects of that mo-
nopoly, is still upon the whole beneficial; though 
a good deal less so than it otherwise would be40.
To conclude, I believe that in Smith 
there is a strong presence of a natural order 
of things that leads to a system of natural 
liberty. But movement toward that system 
is not necessarily linear. Human history 
is convoluted and zigzagging. The natural 
system of liberty interacts with accidents 
of history, such as, say, the barbaric inva-
sions, which inverted the natural order of 
development of Europe, as well as all of our 
natural yet destructive human passions, 
such as, say, those that generated the mer-
cantilist protectionist policies. Yet, despite 
all its imperfections and limitations, many 
today can say with Smith: «and yet it may 
be true, perhaps, that the accommodation 
of an European prince does not always so 
much exceed that of an industrious and 
frugal peasant, as the accommodation of the 
latter exceeds that of many an African king, 
the absolute master of the lives and liber-
ties of ten thousand naked savages»41.
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